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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN
NEW YORK STATE: WHAT REMAINS OF
PEOPLE EX REL. ARCARA v.
CLOUD BOOKS, INC.?
Jeremy J. Bethel*
INTRODUCTION
Legal but unpopular forms of expression have long been af-
forded substantial protection under the New York State Constitu-
tion.1 Fifteen years ago, in People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Inc.,2 the New York Court of Appeals set the New York State stan-
dard for protecting free expression against all legislation impacting
expressive opportunity without reference to the particular source
of protected speech.3
Prior to its remand to the New York Court of Appeals, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,' decided that legis-
lation impacting free expression, but not directly aimed at a source
of free expression, was generally constitutional. Thus, under the
federal Constitution, legislation aimed at quelling activity contain-
ing no protected element-or only indirectly incidentally burden-
ing free expression- is generally acceptable.6 This is true whether
or not that indirect incidental burden also impacts protected
speech.7
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals found the New
York State Constitution provides greater protection against all leg-
islation that incidentally impacts free expression, whether it is
"aimed" at protected speech or merely "hit[s]" protected speech.8
During the past decade, the standard set by the New York Court
of Appeals in People ex rel. Arcara has eroded almost entirely.9
Shortly after the Arcara ruling, the court of appeals distinguished
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., English, Liter-
ature & Rhetoric, summa cum laude, Binghamton University, 1997.
1. Infra note 21 and accompanying text.
2. 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986).
3. Id.; infra Part I.C.
4. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
5. Id. at 702-04; infra Part I.B.
6. Arcara, 478 U.S. 697; Infra Part I.A.
7. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
8. People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 495.
9. Infra Part II.
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Arcara from cases involving zoning regulation of protected
speech.10 Zoning regulation is constitutionally favored 1' so courts
allow legislation that burdens protected speech if the regulations
can reasonably be described as attempts to abate the adverse "sec-
ondary effects" of protected expression.12 However, the court of
appeals failed to adequately describe which test is to be applied to
what type of burden and on what factual basis. 3 As a result of the
distinction made by the court of appeals in Arcara, and the court's
reluctance to overrule that case, 4 a New York State municipality
may find it easier to shut down an "adult"'" use by directly attack-
ing legal speech through zoning regulation, than to shut it down by
attacking illegal activity conducted on the premises.' 6
Cases following Arcara purport to illustrate the higher degree of
protection against incidental infringement of free expression pro-
vided under the New York State Constitution.' 7 However, those
cases, while generally acknowledging the high standard set in Ar-
cara, fail to offer that same level of protection, blurring the line
between the application of "incidental burdens" jurisprudence and
the "secondary effects" jurisprudence of zoning regulation.18 Yet
the court of appeals continues to call Arcara the "[s]tate constitu-
tional standard,"1 9 despite the insignificant protection it actually af-
fords.2 ° If New York State truly intends to continue its "long
history and tradition of fostering freedom of expression, [by] often
tolerating and supporting works which in other [s]tates would be
found offensive to the community, ' 21 then a less elastic standard
must be implemented than one that largely allows a court's assess-
10. Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1989).
11. Id. at 217 ("Because zoning ordinances are legislative acts they enjoy a strong
presumption of constitutionality and if there is a reasonable relation between the end
sought to be achieved and the means adopted to achieve it the regulation will be
upheld."); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
12. Infra Part I.A.
13. Infra Part II.
14. Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407, 417-18
(N.Y. 1998).
15. Infra note 183.
16. Compare Time Square Books, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 223 A.D.2d at 270
(N.Y. 1996), and People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 492, with Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d
215, and Stringfellow's of New York, 694 N.E.2d at 407.
17. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
18. Infra Part II.
19. Stringfellow's of New York, 694 N.E.2d at 417.
20. Id.; Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 231-32.
21. People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 494 (citing People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68
N.Y.2d 296 (1986); Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 221 (citation omitted).
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ment of the importance of legislative purpose to dictate the degree
to which free expression may be infringed.22
This Note explores the decline of People ex rel. Arcara in New
York State jurisprudence over the last decade. Part I describes
traditional and contemporary methods of testing free expression
infringements, including a discussion of federal minimum stan-
dards, and protection expansions implemented by the New York
Court of Appeals. Both the U.S. Supreme Court's and the New
York Court of Appeals' Arcara holdings are also examined. Part II
describes the effect of federal "secondary effects" jurisprudence
upon the People ex rel. Arcara standard, and how that encounter
skewed lower court application of that standard for all cases in-
volving "content-neutral" infringement ofprotected speech. Fi-
nally, Part III examines the illogical consequences of the court of
appeals' method of deciding expressive freedom cases, arguing that
a substantial abatement effort, in the nature of sanctions, should be
required to help insure the proper balance between community
needs and protecting free expression. The Note concludes that
such an approach is necessary in order to reestablish New York's
high standard of expressive rights protection.
1. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL MINIMUM STANDARDS OF FREE
EXPRESSION PROTECTION AND ARCARA V.
CLOUD BOOKS
Part I explains the traditional minimum standards set by the U.S.
Supreme Court concerning free expression infringements. It also
examines both the U.S. Supreme Court's and the New York Court
of Appeals' Arcara v. Cloud Books holdings and explores how and
why the court of appeals broke from the minimum standard set by
the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. Federal Minimum Standards for Protecting Against
Infringement of Free Expression
Traditionally, courts test legislation that infringes upon protected
speech based on a "content-based"/"content-neutral" determina-
tion.23 However, the distinction between "content-based" and
22. Infra Part III.A.
23. Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis after Renton, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1904, 1905-06 (1989) [hereinafter The Content Distinction in Free Speech].
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"content-neutral" is not always obvious, and the Supreme Court
has yet to sufficiently clarify the difference. 24
Laurence Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law
School, describes the distinction as one that differentiates between
regulations "aimed at communicative impact," and regulations
"aimed at noncommunicative impact but nonetheless [having] ad-
verse effects on communicative opportunity. '25 A regulation is
"aimed at communicative impact" if it imposes sanctions based on
the content of expression, or the potential impact of expression. 26
A regulation is "aimed at noncommunicative" impact if it restricts
a pursuit that might facilitate expression, or limits a potential com-
municative source, but does not directly impose sanctions based on
the message conveyed.27
Traditionally, a regulation was "content-based" if, on its face, " it
was aimed at communicative impact. '28 For example, a regulation
that restricts adult uses based on the content of performances held
at that use, is a "content-based" regulation.29 A regulation was
"content-neutral" if, on its face, it was aimed at "noncommunica-
tive impact," but still impacted "communicative opportunity. '3°
For example, a health regulation that allows closure of facilities
where health code violations take place even when such closure
impacts communicative opportunity, is a "content-neutral" regula-
tion.31 The distinction between content-based and content neutral
regulations, however, is no longer so clear.
Generally, "content-based" regulations are presumptively inva-
lid under the First Amendment and must be narrowly tailored to
further a compelling state interest.32 However, some "facially con-
24. Ofer Raban, Content-Based, Secondary Effects, and Expressive Conduct: What
in the World do They Mean (and What do They Mean to the United States Supreme
Court)?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 551, 554 (2000).
25. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-90 (2d
ed. 1988); Raban, supra note 24, at 554.
26. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 789-90.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 790.
29. Id. at 789-90.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 798-99 ("The Court applies 'most exacting scrutiny' to regulations that
discriminate among instances of speech based on its content. Such restrictions are
valid only if 'necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn to
that end.'") (citations omitted).
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tent-based" restrictions are now treated as "content-neutral" if jus-
tified by an interest in stemming "secondary harms."33
The United States Supreme Court has created several over-lap-
ping tests for the now numerous forms of "content-neutral" regula-
tion.34 One test governs regulations concerning the time, place,
and manner of speech. A time, place, and manner restriction
might restrict when or where protected expression may be dissemi-
nated, but without reference to specific expression.36 These con-
tent-neutral regulations may be divided into those affecting speech
conducted in a public forum, and those affecting speech conducted
in a private forum. Restrictions effecting speech conducted in a
public forum-such as public parks and streets-must be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. 37 Restrictions
on private forum expression must be narrowly tailored 38 to serve
"a significant government interest and must leave open... alterna-
tive channels [of expression]. 39
A second test governs regulations that "incidentally burden"
speech.4° A regulation that incidentally infringes upon free expres-
sion must satisfy the standard set forth in United States v.
O'Brien.41 In O'Brien, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a convic-
tion for draft card burning as permissible under the First Amend-
ment.42 O'Brien argued that his conduct was protected symbolic
speech, but the court decided to allow infringement of protected
speech when a government regulation: (1) is within the govern-
ment's constitutional power; (2) furthers a substantial interest; (3)
that interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
(4) the incidental infringement is "no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. '43 Although the act was per-
33. The Content Distinction in Free Speech, supra note 23, at 1904. "Secondary
harms" are harms that are not directly related to the communicative impact of the
expression. Id.
34. Id. at 1905-06; City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
35. The Content Distinction in Free Speech, supra note 23, at 1904-06.
36. Once again, a "content-neutral" restriction is not directed at the message con-
veyed, or the potential impact of the message conveyed. If a "content-neutral" regu-
lation restricts speech, it does so in an indirect manner.
37. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 981-82.
38. Infra note 43.
39. The Content Distinction in Free Speech, supra note 23, at 1906.
40. Id. at 1905-06.
41. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968).
42. Id.
43. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697,703 (1986) (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S.
at 377). The fourth part of the O'Brien test is a "narrow tailoring" requirement which
is satisfied "[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than neces-
2001] 1801
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formed in protest of the war in Vietnam, the ordinance under
which O'Brien was convicted was justified as a necessary part of a
well-run drafting process. 44
Finally, a third test deems "facially content-based" regulations to
be "content-neutral" if justified by concerns other than suppressing
legal speech.45 Such "secondary effects" regulations are analyzed
under the standard delineated in City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
ters, Inc. 46 In Renton, a local zoning ordinance prohibited the es-
tablishment of adult movie theaters within a 1000 foot radius "of
any residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church,
park, or school. ' 47 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that such
an ordinance was valid if it (1) served a substantial government
interest; (2) was a "content-neutral" attempt to abate "secondary
effects"; and (3) allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication.48 Although a "facially content-based" regulation
directly limits the impact of a particular type of speech, it only par-
tially restricts that speech based on the intended abatement of
"secondary effects," and, therefore, is analyzed under the time,
place, and manner restrictions standard. 9 The "facially content-
based" standard necessarily entails subjectively determining the
purpose of an ordinance that clearly restricts legal expression, an
unnecessary pursuit prior to the advent of the Renton standard. 50
The tests for content-neutral regulations, and how the New York
Court of Appeals implemented and applied those tests, are dis-
cussed in greater detail below.
B. Arcara and the U.S. Supreme Court
In Arcara v. Cloud Books, the District Attorney of Erie County
tried to close an adult bookstore pursuant to public nuisance law5
sary to achieve the government's interest ... [T]he regulation will not be invalid
simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately
served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
44. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-80.
45. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of Erie v.
Pap's A.M., No. 98-1161, 2000 U.S. Sup. LEXIS 2347 (Mar. 29, 2000) (expanding the
"secondary effects" justification for "facially content-based" regulations to O'Brien,
"incidental burdens" type cases).
46. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 41 (1986).
47. Id. at 43.
48. Id. at 47.
49. The Content Distinction in Free Speech, supra note 23, at 1907-08.
50. Infra Part I.A.
51. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 493 (N.Y. 1986).
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because patrons were using the premises to commit illegal sexual
acts. 2 If granted, an order of closure pursuant to Public Health
Law, article 23, title II, would close the premises where the illegal
acts were conducted, but not terminate the defendant's business,
which he was free to conduct from another space.53
The bookstore sold sexually explicit, but not obscene, books and
movies. 4 In pursuit of abating the illegal sexual activity, no arrests
were made, no injunction was sought, and no criminal charges were
brought against the owner, who was aware of the activities, but
made no attempt to prevent them from occurring. 5
The court of appeals found that closing the bookstore was a vio-
lation of the fourth part of the O'Brien test and therefore unconsti-
tutional; the incidental infringement on the bookstore's freedom of
speech was not essential to further a substantial government inter-
est. 6 Finding that the court of appeals' analysis ignored an impor-
tant factual distinction between O'Brien and Arcara, the U.S.
Supreme Court overruled on appeal. 7 According to the Supreme
Court, the New York Court of Appeals failed to note that the draft
card burning that took place in O'Brien was protected expression,
whereas the illegal activity in Arcara was not.58 The Court found
that the effect of enforcing a public health regulation of general
application against a physical premises where books happen to be
sold was too remote to implicate the First Amendment.59 Closing
the bookstore was thus constitutional.60
The Supreme Court's Arcara holding distinguished between reg-
ulations aimed at the source of protected expression, those that di-
52. Id.
53. Id. at 494 ("Thus during the year the order would be in effect, the place where
the illegal acts occurred would be unhallowed ground, unusable by any person for any
purpose.").
54. Id. at 493.
55. Id. at 493-94.
56. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 1089 (N.Y. 1985).
57. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
58. Id. at 705 ("First Amendment values may not be invoked by merely linking the
words 'sex' and 'books."').
59. Id. at 707. The New York Court of Appeals states that:
A divided Supreme Court held that the bookstore's First Amendment rights
were not affected because they were not sought to be affected .... To the
extent the order might have an effect on the defendant's legitimate booksell-
ing activities, it was deemed to be too remote to implicate First Amendment
concerns. The "least restrictive means test" was held to be applicable only
when the government's action was triggered by and directly aimed at cur-
tailing "conduct that has an expressive element."
People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 494 (N.Y. 1986).
60. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707.
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rectly "incidentally burden" protected speech, as in O'Brien, and
regulations not aimed at the source of protected expression, those
that indirectly "incidentally burden" protected speech, as in Ar-
cara.6 1 Regulations that directly incidentally burden protected ex-
pression are subject to intermediate scrutiny,6" whereas regulations
that indirectly "incidentally burden" protected expression need
only have a rational basis.63
C. Arcara on Remand
On remand from the Supreme Court, the New York Court of
Appeals examined the incidental affects of the potential closure
under the New York State Constitution,64 which might afford
greater protection for incidentally burdened free speech than the
federal minimum standard.65
The court of appeals determined that, because of New York
State's long history of offering freedom of expression a high degree
of protection,66 the national standard for indirect incidental bur-
dens set by the Supreme Court in Arcara was not dispositive. 67
Before analyzing whether to invoke New York State's Constitu-
tional guarantees, 68 the court determined that closing the book-
61. See Andrew E. Forshay, Note, The First Amendment Becomes a Nuisance: Ar-
cara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 216-17 (1987) (arguing that when
"the regulated conduct manifests no expressive element of its own, nor is closely con-
nected to any other expressive activity," the burden of a regulation becomes so inci-
dental that it is easily outweighed by state interests).
62. Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
63. Supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
64. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.").
65. The United States Supreme Court sets minimum standards for the protection
of free expression. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 494
(N.Y. 1986). However, greater protection may be afforded under individual state
constitutions. Id.; People v. P.J. Video, Inc. 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302 (1986).
Freedom of expression in books, movies and the arts, generally, is one of
those areas in which there is greater diversity among the States. Thus it is an
area in which the Supreme Court has displayed great reluctance to expand
Federal constitutional protections, holding instead that this is a matter essen-
tially governed by community standards.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
66. People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 494 (citing P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296
(1986)).
67. Id. at 494-95.
68. Id.
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store for a year would both affect and substantially impact
constitutionally protected activity.69
The court of appeals first noted it is settled law in New York
State that a legitimate government regulation that incidentally im-
pacts protected expression is invalid unless "it is no broader than
needed to achieve its purpose. '70 Although the nuisance regula-
tion at issue had only an incidental impact on free expression,71 the
court decided that "[t]he crucial factor in determining whether
State action affects freedom of expression is the impact of the ac-
tion on the protected activity and not the nature of the activity
which prompted the government to act."72 Therefore, the "crucial
factor" that triggers expressive freedom protection in New York
State is not whether impacted expression is incidentally burdened
directly or indirectly, but whether protected activity "is hit" by the
regulation. 73 The court of appeals' criteria for implicating the "in-
cidental burdens" test places no weight on the alleged purpose or
"aim" of the regulation, but focuses instead on whether protected
speech is impacted by the regulation. If protected speech is inci-
dentally affected, regardless of how, it is subject to one test under
the court of appeals People ex rel. Arcara standard.74 When Arcara
was at the federal level, the U.S. Supreme Court gave greater
weight to the alleged "aim" of the enacting body, distinguishing
between those regulations that indirectly incidentally burden pro-
tected speech, and those that directly incidentally burden protected
speech.
The court of appeals proceeded to impose a "no broader than
needed" requirement for restrictive measures that incidentally bur-
den protected activity, and placed the burden of proof on the mu-
69. Id. at 493-95. "The goal of preventing the illegal acts is concededly a legitimate
State concern-only the means chosen is in issue. It would appear, without more,
that closing the store would be equally disruptive or ineffective with respect to the
activities of both the bookstore and its customers." Id. at 494.
70. Id. at 495 (citing In re Nicholson v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 50
N.Y.2d 597 (1980)).
71. The court of appeals implicitly distinguished between direct and indirect inci-
dental effects on protected speech, as the Supreme Court did in Arcara, but found
that the distinction is "just another way of saying that the impact of the State's action
is not direct but only incidental. Actions of this type are subject to lesser scrutiny that
those directed at restraining free expression, but they cannot be said to have abso-
lutely no constitutional implications." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 (1986).
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nicipality.76 The court clearly implied that the alternative measures
to be undertaken in pursuit of abatement should be both substan-
tial, and in the nature of sanctions, stating: "[Iff other sanctions,
such as arresting the offenders, or injunctive relief prove unavail-
ing, then [the municipality's] burden would be met. '77
Therefore, in People ex rel. Arcara, the New York Court of Ap-
peals appeared to implement one simple test for all incidental in-
fringements of protected speech:78 if (1) constitutionally protected
activity is incidentally burdened by a remedy taken in pursuit of
nuisance abatement legislation, then (2) the municipality must
prove, through the failure of sanctions less restrictive than closure,
that the remedy is "no broader than needed to achieve the pur-
pose ' '79 of the legislation. By rejecting an analysis of the regula-
tion's legislative intent, and instead deciding that implication is
based on impact, or what is "hit," the court of appeals clearly
broke from Supreme Court jurisprudence. People ex rel. Arcara
represented a "fundamental disagreement" with the direct /indirect
"incidental effects" distinction created by the Supreme Court in
Arcara80 and a "new willingness" to expand upon federal minimum
standards.81
76. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 495 (N.Y. 1986).
77. See id. (emphasis added). Although, under the federal Constitution, a "no
broader than needed" requirement is satisfied as long as "the means chosen are not
substantially broader than necessary," in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
800-01 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court created minimum standards which may be
expanded by the individual states. Supra note 65.
78. The court of appeals makes no distinction between the indirect "incidental
burdens" of Arcara-type cases, and the direct "incidental burdens" of O'Brien-type
cases.
79. People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 495.
80. In her note concerning the First Amendment and Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Deborah A. Waldbillig describes the break made by the court of appeals:
The court of appeals' opinion in Cloud Books, following remand from the
Supreme Court ... expressed a fundamental disagreement with the Supreme
Court's prior ruling. While the decision was rendered under the state consti-
tution, the analysis and precedent relied upon was admittedly based upon
the [F]irst [A]mendment to the federal Constitution. As this precedent was
not followed by the Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals was
again forced to secure basic constitutional rights for the citizens of New York
under the New York State Constitution.
Deborah A. Waldbillig, Note, Padlock Orders and Nuisance Laws: The First Amend-
ment in Arcara v. Cloud Books, 51 ALB. L. REV. 1007, 1044 (1987) (citations
omitted).
81. Waldbillig describes People v. P.J. Video, Inc. and Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.
as "evidence [of] a new willingness on the part of the court of appeals to depart from
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution in the
area of freedom of speech, even in the absence of textual or historical distinctions
1806
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II. THE EROSION OF PEOPLE EX REL. ARCARA
Not long after setting New York State's "no broader than
needed" standard for protecting free expression against all inciden-
tal infringements, the court of appeals began to distinguish be-
tween "incidental burdens" and "secondary effects" cases. This
resulted in the carving out of a large niche of lower scrutiny for
"facially content based" zoning ordinances that directly attack pro-
tected speech, but are justified under the umbrella of "secondary
effects" theory.82
In Town of Islip v. Caviglia,83 which was based largely on the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc.,84 the New York Court of Appeals allowed the "no
broader than needed" standard set in People ex rel. Arcara to be-
come dependant upon the scope of relief sought under the ordi-
nance. This decision represented a substantial retraction of its
former determination-that it was not what was "aimed at" by the
regulation that mattered in New York State, but what was "hit." 85
In doing so, the court of appeals invoked the People ex rel. Arcara
standard, but failed to adequately distinguish "facially content-
based" from "incidental burdens" cases, creating an atmosphere of
conflicting application.86
A. Town of Islip v. Caviglia
The Town of Islip zoning ordinance discriminated against adult
uses such as bookstores, theaters, motels, cabarets, and massage
parlors based on the age of those admissible to the premises, and
relegated, to areas designated "Industrial I," those uses to which
minors are not admitted.87 The case before the court of appeals
involved an attempt to enjoin operation of an adult bookstore for
violating the zoning ordinance.88
In order to determine whether the ordinance was an invalid limi-
tation on free expression, the court of appeals first analyzed the
ordinance's constitutionality under the federal City of Renton stan-
dard, noting that municipalities enjoy "broad power" to institute
between the state's constitutional provision and its federal counterpart." Id. (citations
omitted).
82. See Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1989).
83. Id.
84. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
85. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 495 (N.Y. 1986).
86. Infra Part II.B.
87. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 216.
88. Id.
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ordinances that halt "the increasing encroachments of urbanization
on the quality of life."89
Under the City of Renton standard, the Supreme Court has vali-
dated "facially content-based" zoning ordinances such as Town of
Islip's, finding them to be "content-neutral" time, place, or manner
restrictions.90 As interpreted by the court of appeals, City of Ren-
ton allows municipalities to regulate adult uses through zoning if it
can be established that
(1) the "predominant purpose" of the ordinance is not to con-
trol the content of the material purveyed but to control the "sec-
ondary effects" of such uses on the surrounding community,91
(2) the ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmen-
tal interest, (3) it is narrowly tailored to affect only the category
of uses that produce the unwanted effects, and (4) it allows for
reasonable alternative avenues of expression.92
The court of appeals found that Town of Islip's ordinance satisfied
this standard, the "predominant purpose" of the legislation being
the alleviation of adult use "secondary effects" such as "urban
blight," "neighborhood deterioration" and "heightened public ap-
prehension" of entering business areas where adult uses are
located.93
In support of its decision, the Town of Islip was allowed to
"credit the evidence in its study of past deterioration and the pre-
89. Id. at 217. "Undeniably, the purpose of preventing the deterioration of neigh-
borhoods, including downtown business districts, comes well within the confines of
the public welfare that defines the limits of the police power." Id. at 218.
90. Id.
91. Before Renton, courts generally deemed a regulation content-neutral or con-
tent-based by "examining its express language." The Content Distinction in Free
Speech, supra note 23, at 1906. A regulation that on its face regulated speech by
subject matter was a content-based regulation regardless of the enacting body's sup-
posed justification for the regulation. Id. That is, a "facially content based" statute
was deemed content-based "whether [or not] the statute could be or was defended as
a means of preventing a harm entirely unrelated to communicative impact." Id. at
1907.
92. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 218 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
93. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 218-19. The court of appeals found that:
The governmental interest supporting the ordinance is the eradication of the
effects of urban blight and neighborhood deterioration and furtherance of
the general underlying purpose of zoning, the enhancement of the quality of
life for the Town's residents. Studies relied on and prepared by the Town
demonstrated that the location of adult businesses in certain areas height-
ened public apprehension about entering them, thus driving out traditional
downtown businesses as customers avoided locations near adult bookstores,
increased criminal activity and lowered nearby residential property values.
Id. at 219.
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diction that, unless remedied, the deterioration would continue." 94
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the City of Renton to
rely on the "experiences of Seattle and other cities," because "[t]he
First Amendment" does not require a municipality to "conduct
new studies or produce evidence independent of that already gen-
erated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies
upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the
city addresses." 95
Turning to New York State's standard, the court of appeals
evoked People ex rel. Arcara, which it called "the applicable state
standard" for determining whether "the [t]own went too far and
enacted an ordinance that had an impermissible incidental effect
abridging free expression." '96 The court began its analysis by recog-
nizing "content-neutral" restrictions like those in Arcara and
Caviglia as "those justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech and relating only to the time, place, and manner
of expression." 97 The court made no distinction between "inciden-
tal burdens" "content-neutral" cases, such as Arcara, and "secon-
dary effects" "facially content-based" cases, such as Caviglia or
City of Renton.98 The court of appeals lumped the cases together
and found restrictions imposed by such "content-neutral" legisla-
tion to be valid if the governmental interest outweighs the inciden-
tal interference with protected expression.99 However, the court of
appeals made no such statement concerning "content-neutral" leg-
islation in People ex rel. Arcara.00 In that case, the court merely
stated that if protected expression is "hit," then abatement mea-
94. Id.
95. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 91, 51-52 (1986).
96. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 222.
97. Id. at 221.
98. The court of appeals describes the distinction between content-based and con-
tent-neutral as follows:
Governmental action may restrict speech either intentionally or incidentally.
Intentional restrictions are directed at the message conveyed, either its con-
tent or the time, place and manner in which it is disseminated. Generally
speaking, if the regulation is content-based it is presumptively invalid and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny. However, content-neutral restrictions,
those justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech and
relating only to the time, place, and manner of expression, are valid if the
governmental interest to be achieved outweighs the resulting interference
with free expression.
Id.
99. Id. at 221.
100. See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 494-95 (N.Y.
1986).
2001] 1809
1810 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL[Vol. XXVIII
sures must be "no broader than needed" to achieve legislative pur-
pose.10 1 Subjecting "facially content-based" regulations to lower
scrutiny is tantamount to assessing the importance of what is
"aimed at" by a regulation, as it inevitably requires a court to sub-
jectively determine the weight to give legislative purpose in enact-
ing an ordinance. This practice was to be avoided under the People
ex rel. Arcara "what is hit" test.10 2
In the course of analyzing the constitutionality of Town of Islip's
zoning ordinance, the court of appeals determined that People ex
rel. Arcara created no absolute standard, 103 and that its holding did
not require a municipality to show that it undertook alternative
remedies that were insufficient. 10 4 This substantially undercuts the
People ex rel. Arcara ruling. According to the court, requiring al-
ternative undertakings "amounts to nothing more than a disagree-
ment with the [t]own over how much corrective action is wise and
how best it may be achieved."'0 5
To distinguish Caviglia from People ex rel. Arcara, the court
states that:
In this case, unlike Arcara where the asserted governmental in-
terest could have been secured by criminal proceedings or in-junction, the adverse affects of adult uses on Islip's
neighborhoods are not subject to direct attack and the [t]own's
101. Id. at 495.
102. Id.
103. Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215, 223 (1989). The majority opinion
states that the "no broader than necessary" test implemented by People ex rel. Arcara
is not to be equated with the "least restrictive means" standard "used in First Amend-
ment analysis to test regulations incidentally burdening speech," as the dissenters con-
tend the "no broader than necessary" test should be applied. Id.
104. The majority admits that alternative remedies could be used to address the
problem, but finds that "that is not to say that they are constitutionally required." Id.
at 223.
105. Id. The court of appeals explains why alternative measures need not be
attempted:
The members ofthe judiciary are hardly authorities on zoning and planning
competent to frame broadly based provisions of an ordinance sufficiently to
meet the needs of the community and protect it from the harms caused by
adult uses. To suggest alternative provisions amounts to nothing more than
a disagreement with the [t]own over how much corrective action is wise and
how best it may be achieved. The ordinance adopted is an appropriate
method for addressing existing problems; it is not overinclusive and it does
not unduly restrict adult uses to limited or unsuitable areas of the [t]own.
Accordingly, the ordinance, as approved by the Appellate Division, is "no
broader than needed" for the intended purpose and does not violate the
State Constitution.
Id. at 223-24 (citations omitted).
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use of its zoning powers was the most appropriate means to ad-
dress its substantive problems. 10 6
The court bases the subject/not subject to "direct attack" distinc-
tion on the "obvious[ness]" of potential alternative abatement
measures. 10 7 In People ex rel. Arcara, the court notes, "there were
obvious means for directly policing the illegal conduct without clos-
ing premises on which a lawful business was being operated.' 10 8
However, in the present case, the court summarily dismisses such
alternatives as unnecessary and finds the ordinance to be "the most
appropriate means to address [the town's] substantive
problems."' 09
The Caviglia court construes the "no broader than needed" stan-
dard of People ex rel. Arcara according to the "predominant pur-
pose" of the legislation, as seen in federal cases."0 It reduces the
"no broader than needed" standard to a "most appropriate means"
standard, and the criteria for meeting that standard are determined
predominantly by the municipality.111
People ex rel. Arcara is distinguished from Caviglia based on a
subject/not subject to "direct attack" determination. But the court
of appeals appears to lump "incidental burdens" cases and "secon-
dary effects" cases together under the moniker of "content-neu-
tral," while stating that People ex rel. Arcara remains "the state
constitutional standard" for "incidental burdens."' 12 Therefore,
the definition of "incidental" now appears to include the effect of
ordinances deemed "facially content-based,"' 3-- a determination
that inherently requires that an ordinance be subjected to a "what
is aimed at" assessment." 4 The Caviglia ruling lowers the New
York State standard set in People ex rel. Arcara, and potentially
makes all regulations that burden protected speech subject to that
lower standard of scrutiny." 5
106. Id. at 223.
107. Id.
108. Id. The court states that "[a]rguments can be advanced that different tech-
niques should be used to address the problem ... but that is not to say that they are
constitutionally required." Id. The factual criteria that would delineate when the
court of appeals should not agree with a town are unclear. Id.
109. Id.
110. Compare Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 215, with City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 41.
111. See Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 223.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Compare Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 223, with People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d
492 (N.Y. 1986).
115. Infra Part I.B.
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As a result of the Caviglia ruling, the People ex rel. Arcara stan-
dard is either reduced to a new "incidental burdens" standard or
made one of a pair of standards, one governing "facially content-
based" cases, and the other governing "incidental burdens" cases.
Under the People ex rel. Arcara test, if constitutionally protected
activity is incidentally burdened by remedies taken in pursuit of
nuisance abatement legislation, then the municipality must prove,
through sanctions less restrictive than closure, that the remedy is
"no broader than needed to achieve the purpose" of the legislation.
However, because of Caviglia, the test becomes, or is paired with, a
new standard: if constitutionally protected activity is incidentally
burdened by remedies taken in pursuit of nuisance abatement leg-
islation,'1 6 then the owner of the adult use must prove that the mu-
nicipality did not pursue the "most appropriate means" of abating
the nuisance.' 17 Determining what standard courts should use de-
pends, apparently, on whether the adverse effects of legal speech
are "subject to direct attack" or "not subject to direct attack" in
each particular case. 1 8
In a scathing dissent, Judge Titone found that Caviglia was noth-
ing more than the "incorporation of [a] 'predominant purpose' test
into the framework of [New York] States' freedom of speech juris-
prudence."1 ' 9 A predominant purpose test, he thought, could not
be squared with the "no broader than needed" standard for "inci-
dental burdens" implemented by the court of appeals in People ex
rel. Arcara.2 20 Judge Titone argued that it was not the purpose, or
the "aim," of the ordinance that was of paramount importance in
116. Or, perhaps, this applies only to "facially content-based" zoning ordinancesjustified by an attack on "secondary effects," if the Caviglia standard applies only to
such cases.
117. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
118. Supra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
119. Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215, 230 (N.Y. 1989) (Titone, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Titone states that:
Although the majority does not explicitly adopt or apply the "predominant
purpose" test, in the absence of some other clearly articulated principle, the
majority opinion must be read as an incorporation of the "predominant pur-
pose" test into the framework of our State's freedom of speech jurispru-
dence. It is the use of this test, or any other test, that converts a content-
based regulation into a content-neutral regulation.
Id. at 230 (Titone, J., dissenting). Judge Titone describes the effect Caviglia has on
New York State freedom of expression jurisprudence in terms of the effect that City
of Renton has on First Amendment jurisprudence because "it allows an otherwise
content-based regulation to be recast as content-neutral so long as the stated motiva-
tion for the regulation is something other than the suppression of speech." Id. (Titone,
J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 233 (Titone, J., dissenting). Judge Titone notes:
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deciding what level of scrutiny should be employed to assess con-
stitutionality, but the ordinance's impact on free expression. 121
B. Caviglia Fallout in the Lower Courts: Restrictive
Interpretation of People ex rel. Arcara in Considering
Non-Zoning Legislation
The Caviglia decision had an obvious effect on lower court inter-
pretation of the test implemented by the court of appeals in People
ex rel. Arcara. Following the Caviglia ruling, a clear pattern
emerged in which First Department lower courts easily allowed
municipal goals to subordinate incidental impact on free expres-
sion, regardless of the nature of the restrictive measure.
In City of New York v. Dana,12 2 the City of New York sought to
close an adult theater in an alleged effort to control the spread of
HIV.' 23 The city sought closure pursuant to the State Sanitary
Code,2 4 which prohibits establishments that furnish facilities for
activities such as "anal intercourse and fellatio"1 2 5 that are a
"threat to the public health" and allows closure of the establish-
ment by local health officers as "constituting a public nuisance. 126
This language, in traditional terms, constitutes "content-neutral"
On remand in Arcara II, we held that regardless of whether a regulation is
aimed at speech or at noncommunicative activity, our State Constitution re-
quires that the regulation satisfy a "least restrictive means" standard if it
affects expression. Indeed, we stated: "the crucial factor in determining
whether State action affects freedom of expression is the impact of the ac-
tion on the protected activity and not the nature of the activity which
prompted the government to act. The test, in traditional terms, is not who is
aimed at but who is hit." Hence, any content-neutral regulation which has
the affect of "hitting" speech must be "no broader than needed to achieve its
purpose," a test which logically requires use of the least restrictive means. In
this State, the purpose of an ordinance is constitutionally irrelevant for it is
only the impact that matters. Hence, we have already rejected any type of
"predominant purpose" test.
Id. (citing People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 495 (N.Y.
1986)) (Titone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added in Caviglia).
121. Judge Titone argues that if the court of appeals truly intends to provide greater
protection against incidental infringement of expressive freedoms in New York State,
then "the 'predominant purpose' test must be rejected under our State Constitution."
Id. at 232 (Titone, J., dissenting).
122. 627 N.Y.S.2d 273 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
123. Id. at 274.
124. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 10, § 24-2.3 (1998).
125. Dana, 627 N.Y.S.2d. at 274.
126. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 10, § 24-2 (1998); Dana, 627 N.Y.S.2d at
274.
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regulation, which, if it infringes upon legal speech, does so indi-
rectly and incidentally, as in Arcara.127
The city inspected on several occasions and notified the owners
by letter that patrons were engaging in high-risk sexual activity in
the theater.12 However, the city made no arrests, and no injunc-
tion was issued against the illegal activity. 129
The defendants argued that only the failure of "judicial" action,
such as the issuance of an injunction, could satisfy the "no broader
than needed" standard implemented by People ex rel. Arcara.3 °
But the New York County Supreme Court disagreed with defen-
dant's argument, finding, on its own, that People ex rel. Arcara im-
plemented no specific standard.'31 Instead, the court noted
defendants' efforts to, and ultimate inability to, self-monitor as an
indication that alternative measures would not suffice.' 32 Then, cit-
ing People ex rel. Arcara as the applicable standard, and the letters
sent by the city as evidence that less restrictive means were at-
tempted and failed, 133 the court found that closure was the least
127. Compare People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 492 with Dana, 627 N.Y.S.2d at
273.
128. Dana, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
129. See id. at 275.
130. Id. at 276.
131. Id. The Supreme Court fails to cite Caviglia for this proposition. Id.
132. The court states that "[n]o principal of the Cinema offered a sworn affidavit or
appeared at trial to testify with respect to any proposal to eliminate offending activity
while remaining open." Dana, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 277. When defendants' counsel states
that defendant's are prepared to enact self policing measures, the court rejects this
proposal, stating that:
Given the Cinema's past inability to monitor itself, even after being put on
notice that it was being watched, any scheme that would rely upon the Cin-
ema to police itself ultimately requires the constant presence of City inspec-
tors to ensure that the Cinema does not abdicate its responsibility as it has in
the past. This is not a viable alternative. The only truly effective way to
abate the nuisance at the Cinema is to close it.
Id. In People ex rel. Arcara, the burden of proving the failure of narrower means of
abating the nuisance was clearly on the municipality. People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d
at 495.
133. Dana, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 276. The court states "[n]othing in [People ex rel Ar-
cara] suggests that the lesser state action that proves unavailing must be judicial; to
the contrary, one suggested course of action in [People ex rel. Arcara], arresting the
offending patrons, is executive rather than judicial in nature." Id. However, the court
of appeals in People ex rel. Arcara stated that "[i]f other sanctions, such as arresting
the offenders, or injunctive relief prove unavailing, then [the municipality's] burden
would be met," clearly implying that the appropriate standard for satisfying the "no
broader than needed" test is judicial or executive action in the nature of sanctions.
People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 495 (N.Y. 1986). The
letters sent by the City, in the Dana case contained warnings of sanctions, but clearly
were not in the nature of sanctions. Dana, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75. Additionally, the
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restrictive means of abatement. 34
The supreme court factually distinguished Dana from Arcara
based on the "life and death" nature of the AIDS crisis and "the
immediacy of the plague in our midst,"' 35 although the activity to
be abated in Dana is essentially the same as that in People ex rel.
Arcara.13
6
In a factually similar case, City of New York v. Capri Cinema,37
the New York County Supreme Court shut down another adult cin-
ema pursuant to The State Sanitary Code. 38 The court justified
closure in this case by directly citing the breadth of power given
municipalities under Caviglia.13 9 However, the court proceeded to
analyze the closure request under People ex rel. Arcara, distin-
guishing Capri from People ex rel. Arcara based on the more seri-
ous nature of the threat, as was done in Dana.140 Other than
warnings, the court cites only actions taken by the theater owners
as evidence of the "inescapable conclusion that defendants them-
selves have demonstrated that nothing short of closure will elimi-
nate the proscribed conduct."'4 Again, no arrests were made, and
specific examples given in People ex rel. Arcara,"arresting the offending patrons," and
"injunctive relief" clearly denote that such alternate measures are to be substantial.
People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 495.
134. Dana, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
135. Id. "[U]nlike [People ex rel. Arcara], the closing of the Cinema is motivated by
the AIDS crisis, an epidemic of staggering proportions with no cure in sight .... To
first require injunctive relief in the face of the proven futility of any less intrusive
solution would ignore the immediacy of the plague in our midst." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). Considering the apparent seriousness of the situation, it is problematic that the
City attempted only one "less intrusive solution": sending letters of warning. Id.
136. Compare id. with People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 495.
137. 641 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1995). The City notified the theater by letter that
"acts of fellatio have been observed in various parts of your establishment . . .
[n]othing short of the immediate cessation of the prohibited sexual activities in your
theater is acceptable. Unless you eliminate such activities at once, we will seek a court
order closing your premises." Id. at 971.
138. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REOS. TIT. 10, § 24-2 (1985).
139. Capri Cinema, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 972-73. ("Surely if the [s]tate's police power is
sustainable when used to zone adult oriented establishments to prevent the deteriora-
tion of neighborhoods, the exercise of such power must be upheld when its goal is to
prevent the spread of a disease that is the leading cause of death among adults aged
25 to 44 in New York City.").
140. The court applied the "no broader than needed" standard implemented by
People ex rel. Arcara, but factually distinguished this situation as a "life and death
issue-preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS." Id. at 973. The court added that the
alternatives to be undertaken "must be obvious and must be undertaken unless there
is evidence to show the means are inadequate." Id.
141. Id. at 973-74. The steps taken by defendants included: (1) posting signs; (2)
warning patrons that they would be removed if caught engaging in illegal activity; (3)
showing a trailer before shows that notified them about AIDS prevention and appli-
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no injunction was issued against the illegal activity.142 The court,
this time citing Caviglia, determined that none were necessary. 143
In City of New York v. 777-779 Eighth Avenue Corp.,4 the Ap-
pellate Division, First Department, closed another adult cinema,
again pursuant to the State Sanitary Code, 45 based on allegations
of illegal sexual conduct occurring on the premises. 146 Following
People ex rel. Arcara through Caviglia, the court determined that
the Caviglia court implemented a "most appropriate means" test
applicable to "incidental burdens" type cases, such as this one. 147
The burden of the People ex rel. Arcara/Caviglia test is satisfied by
the failed pursuit of a less restrictive course of action prior to clo-
sure.' 48 Specifically, the court found the People ex rel. Arcara stan-
dard was "clearly" satisfied through "explicit pre-closure
warning. 1 49
cable laws; (4) the keeping of a log book to note significant activity; (5) purchasing
jackets marked security for theater monitors; (6) the hiring of an additional security.
Id. However, the court notes that:
The overwhelming and totally credible testimony of such rampant sexual ac-
tivity, and the absence of any notation in the log book created to record
significant activities, simply undermine the testimony of one of the Theater's
monitors, that between receipt of the March 3 letter and the Theater's clo-
sure at the end of August he regularly evicted two to three people a week for
engaging in sexual activity. That testimony, if believed, clearly demonstrates
either that the intensified efforts were purely cosmetic, or that monitoring at
any level proved to be an ineffective tool and amount to nothing more than
an exercise in futility.
Id. at 974.
142. Id. at 970-71.
143. The court found that "[b]y stating that the asserted governmental interest in
[People ex rel.] Arcara 'could' have been secured by criminal proceedings or injunc-
tion, short of closure, the [Caviglia] majority interpreted Arcara as suggesting arrests
and injunctions as alternatives, rather than mandates, and that such alternatives were
in response to the prosecutor's failure to take any steps whatsoever prior to seeking
closure of the bookstore." Id. at 974 (citing Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215,
223 (N.Y. 1989)). However, the Caviglia court never states that criminal proceedings
or injunction could not have secured the asserted governmental interest, it merely
finds that those measures are not "constitutionally required." Id. at 223.
144. 640 N.Y.S.2d 546 (App. Div. 1996).
145. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 10, § 24-2 (1985).
146. 777-779 Eight Avenue Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d 547 (App. Div. 1996).
147. The appellate division found that the court of appeals in Caviglia specifically
recognized that People ex rel. Arcara does not require proof in every case that alter-
native remedies have been attempted without success before closure, nor mandate
that any particular steps be taken in a graduated order before closure, but rather held
that "the most appropriate means" to deal with the particular problem under the
particular circumstances may be taken. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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In City of New York v. 56-01 Queens Boulevard, Inc.150 the City
of New York sought an injunction151 pursuant to the city's Nui-
sance Abatement Law to close an exotic dancing establishment
where cocaine and marijuana were sold. 152 The Nuisance Abate-
ment Law153 makes "public nuisance[s]" of establishments where
there have been three or more violations of New York Penal Law
sections dealing with controlled substances over the course of one
year. 1
54
The court found that the owners of the establishment were in no
way responsible for the nuisance.155 However, under what the
court referred to as People ex rel. Arcara's "no broader than
needed" standard, the owners bear the burden of establishing the
effectiveness of alternative measures. 56 Because "[t]he manage-
ment suggests no further measures that might be taken to correct
the situation," the court concluded that "there is no form of action
less restrictive than the closing of [the] establishment, which might
allow it to continue while protecting the public against [the] public
nuisance.' '1 57
Regardless of whether the case is an "incidental burdens" type
case or a "secondary effects" type case, a majority of First Depart-
ment courts have shifted to a Caviglia glossed interpretation of the
People ex rel. Arcara standard.158 In such cases, a "no broader than
needed" test becomes a "most appropriate means" test once any
alternative measure, such as a warning, has proven insufficient to
abate illegal activity. 159 The First Department also has shifted the
burden of proof concerning alternative remedies from the munici-
pality to the owner.160
150. 660 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
151. Pursuant to New York City's Nuisance Abatement Law, the city may establish
its entitlement to an injunction "simply by proving the illegal conduct during the rele-
vant time period. Moreover, it has been held that the owner's lack of knowledge of
the illegal conduct is not necessarily a bar to the injunction." 56-01 Queens Blvd., Inc.,
660 N.Y.S.2d at 348 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 347.
153. Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-701 et seq. (1995).
154. 56-01 Queens Blvd., 660 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (citing Administrative Code of the
City of New York § 7-703 [g]).
155. The court found that "[tihere is no evidence, in particular, that the sales were
so notorious as to place a landlord out of possession on notice. It cannot be said,
therefore, that the owners bear any culpability for the nuisance." Id. at 348.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See supra Part lI.B.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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However, all courts have not followed this trend. In Time
Square Books v. City of Rochester,'61 in which another municipality
attempted to restrict legal speech in an alleged effort to curtail the
spread of AIDS, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
strictly followed People ex rel. Arcara.'6z
C. Time Square Books v. City of Rochester
Time Square Books involved amendments to the City of Roches-
ter's Municipal Code designed to regulate public entertainment es-
tablishments that provide booths for the private viewing of adult
entertainment.163 The amended ordinance required such adult es-
tablishments to alter the structure of booths so that the interiors
were at all times fully visible from the outside.'64 Establishments
were also required to strictly enforce a one-person-per-booth man-
date.' 6 5 In traditional terms, this is a "content-based" regulation
because it designates a particular expressive source for
regulation. 166
In Time Square Books, plaintiffs challenged the open booth re-
quirement. 167 The court began its analysis by noting the ordinances
legitimacy under the Federal Constitution,' 68 but found the New
York State standard higher.1 69 Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance
was a presumptively invalid content-based restriction because "it
single[d] out 'adult entertainment' for regulation.'1 70 The court,
however, found a content-based/content-neutral determination un-
necessary "because plaintiffs have established the likelihood of
their right to relief under the less exacting standard applied to reg-
ulations burdening speech only incidentally" as set forth in People
161. 645 N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. Div. 1996).
162. Id. at 956-58.
163. Id. at 953.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Supra Part I.A.
167. Time Square Books, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 953-54.
168. The court states that similar ordinances have "thus far withstood every chal-
lenge made under the Federal Constitution." Id. at 954.
169. "Historically, New York has assumed a preeminent position in the Federal
system through its tradition of providing 'a hospitable climate for the free exchange of
ideas."' Id. at 955 (quoting Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 249
(1991)). "That tradition of protecting free expression includes 'tolerance of the uncon-
ventional and of what may appear bizarre or even offensive.'" Id. (quoting People v.
Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 488 (1992)). "Indeed, 'New York is a State where freedom of
expression and experimentation has not only been tolerated, but encouraged."' Id.
(quoting People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 300 (1986)).
170. Time Square Books, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
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ex rel. Arcara.'71 Although this case does not involve an attempted
closure, as Arcara did, the court notes that nothing in the People ex
rel. Arcara ruling suggests that the "no broader than needed to
achieve its purpose" standard it implements is limited to
closures.172
Citing People ex rel. Arcara, the court determined that
"[d]efendants" have not demonstrated that the ordinance is "no
broader than necessary" to achieve their stated objective of
"preventing the transmission of AIDS and other sexually transmit-
ted diseases.' 1 73 According to the court, "enforcement" of the re-
cently enacted amendment concerning solid wall requirements and
one-person-per-booth is a clear alternative to the open booth re-
quirement. 74 The court also noted that plaintiffs have offered to
"remove [several] feet from the bottom of booth doors to aid en-
forcement," and that "[d]efendants have offered no evidence sug-
gesting that those less restrictive alternatives would be any less
effective in meeting their objective than opening the booths to
public view.' 1 75 The appellate division's view represents not only
strict adherence to People ex rel. Arcara, but also a substantial ex-
pansion of its scope to non-closure infringements that are, in con-
temporary terms, "facially content based. 176
The appellate division distinguished Time Square Books from
Caviglia as the court of appeals distinguished Caviglia from People
ex rel. Arcara in the Caviglia ruling-based on the likelihood that
"direct-attack" will produce the desired results of the legislation's
"predominant purpose. 177 According to the court, like the illegal
sexual activity in Arcara, and unlike the "secondary effects" to be
abated in Caviglia, the activity in Time Square Books is "'subject to
direct attack' through injunctive relief, [and] criminal prosecutions
of persons violating the laws prohibiting prostitution.' 78 How-
171. Id.
172. Id. at 956 (quoting People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492,
495 (N.Y. 1986)). Rather, the court finds, "that standard is triggered simply by the
question 'whether the [city] went too far and enacted an ordinance that had an imper-
missible incidental effect abridging free expression.'" Id. (quoting Town of Islip v.
Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215, 222 (N.Y. 1989).
173. Id.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. Id.
176. Supra Part I.A.
177. Time Square Books, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
178. Id.; Compare Time Square Books, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 951, with Caviglia, 540
N.E.2d at 215, and People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 492.
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ever, Rochester's ordinance is clearly "facially content-based," un-
like the ordinance in Arcara, but like the ordinance in Caviglia.'79
D. Closing the Door on People ex rel. Arcara for Zoning
Purposes: Stringfellow's of New York v. City of New York
In 1998, nine years after the Caviglia decision, Judge Titone who
had written in dissent of that case, changed his mind about People
ex rel. Arcara. In Stringfellow's of New York v. City of New York' 8°
his unanimous opinion upheld the constitutionality of New York
City's Amended Zoning Regulation.' 8'
In Stringfellow's of New York, adult use establishments in the
Times Square area brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the City's
Amended Zoning Ordinance ("Zoning Amendment") on constitu-
tional grounds. 8 2 Much like the zoning ordinances at issue in
Caviglia and City of Renton, the Zoning Amendment is applicable
to all "adult establishment[s]' 183 and includes a wide "array of site
limitations and anticlustering provisions," including restrictions on
locating or being located in residential zones or within 500 feet of
"schools, houses of worship, day care centers, other adult uses, and
zoning districts where new residential development is allowed."184
Initially, the court analyzed the ordinance under the federal City
of Renton standard for "facially content-based" ordinances. 18 5 The
court considered whether (1) the predominant purpose of the chal-
lenged ordinance was to ameliorate the negative "secondary ef-
fects" of adult uses rather than to suppress their content, (2)
whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored to affect only those
uses shown to produce the unwanted "secondary effects," and (3)
whether the ordinance provided adequate alternative locations for
179. Time Square Books, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 953-55.
180. 694 N.E.2d 407 (N.Y. 1998).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 413-14.
183. Id. at 412-13. Adult establishments are defined as
those commercial enterprises in which a 'substantial portion' of the premises
[is] used as an adult book store, an 'adult eating or drinking establishment,'
an 'adult theater' or 'other adult commercial establishment' . . . [that] 'regu-
larly feature[s]' or devote a 'substantial portion' of [its] stock-in-trade to en-
tertainment or material that is 'characterized by an emphasis on' 'specified
anatomical areas' or 'specified sexual activities' . . . 'adult theaters' and
'other adult commercial establishments' are covered only if they exclude mi-
nors because of their age.
Id. (citing Amended Zoning Resolution § 12-10 (1995)).
184. Id. at 413 (citing Amended Zoning Resolution §§ 32-01 [b], 42-01 [b] (1995)).
185. Id. at 415.
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adult business within the town.18 6 The court found the Zoning
Amendment to be a constitutionally valid, "content-neutral"
regulation.18 7
Then the court of appeals turned to the New York State Consti-
tution. 188 The court began by evoking the Caviglia decision as il-
lustrative of the "proper balance between community needs and
free expression under [New York's] [C]onstitution,"189 apparently
setting Caviglia as the New York State standard for balancing
"community needs and free expression."' 90
Prior to analyzing the regulation under the New York State Con-
stitution, the court of appeals compared the federal and state stan-
dards.' 91 Under Caviglia, the court considered (1) whether the
town's ordinance is "justified by concerns unrelated to speech," (2)
it is "no broader than needed to achieve its purpose" under People
ex rel. Arcara, and (3) whether "if the ordinance [were] enforced
the total number of adult bookstores w[ould] decline or ... fewer
potential customers w[ould] be able to conveniently patronize
them."192
The court found City of Renton's "predominant purpose" test
and Caviglia's "justified by concerns unrelated to speech" test
roughly analogous, 93 and essentially adopted a City of Renton type
"facially content-based" test for cases that it refers to as "these
cases."'194 However, the court continued to call People ex rel. Ar-
cara "the [s]tate constitutional standard.' 1 95 The defense invoked
that case and argued that less restrictive means such as "more ag-
gressive enforcement of existing penal and public nuisance laws,
developing targeted signage requirements and limiting adult-use
186. Id. at 414-20.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 414-15.
189. Id. at 415.
190. In further support of the Caviglia standard, the court of appeals states that
"lilt is against the template of [Caviglia], that we measure plaintiffs' claims in these
cases." Id. at 415.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215, 221-23 (N.Y. 1989)).
193. Id. The court found that in the context of the facts of Caviglia, the City of
Renton "predominant purpose" standard and the Caviglia "purposeful attempt to reg-
ulate speech" standard are essentially the same, "since it is apparent from the amend-
ments' legislative history that ameliorating the negative social consequences of
proliferating adult uses was the city's only goal." Id.
194. Id. What the court means by "these cases" is unclear. The court of appeals
makes no distinction between "incidental burdens" cases and "secondary effects"
cases in either People ex rel. Arcara or Caviglia.
195. Id. at 417.
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zoning restrictions to new establishments"' 96 might successfully
abate the adverse activities. But the court of appeals nonetheless
found that, through studies, the city "reasonably determined" that
such alternatives would not remedy the adversities. 197
E. Is Time Square Books an Anomaly?
Unlike People ex rel. Arcara, but much like Caviglia, the String-
fellow's of New York court required the municipality undertake no
abatement measures prior to enforcement.' 98 However, the court
made no attempt to factually distinguish Stringfellow's of New York
from People ex rel. Arcara based on the "subject to direct attack"/
not "subject to direct attack" determination made in Caviglia.199
What the court did do is establish a Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New
York test that incorporates a Caviglia glossed version of the People
ex rel. Arcara standard as the proper standard for "these cases,"
that it, again, neglected to define.20
If the Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New York standard is to be ap-
plied to both "incidental burdens" type cases and "facially content-
based" type cases, then People ex rel. Arcara, and, correspondingly,
Time Square Books, which is factually similar to Arcara, but con-
cerns a non-zoning "facially content-based" regulation, are no
longer good law. Although the Stringfellows's of New York court
made no attempt to distinguish between "incidental burdens" cases
and "facially content based" cases, and abandons the "subject to
direct attack"/not "subject to direct attack" distinction made in
196. Id.
197. Id. at 418. As support, the court of appeals cites City Planning Commission
reports concluding that restricting only new adult uses would freeze certain neighbor-
hoods as adult sites, making the abatement of existing blight impossible; that sign
regulations would not be effective because "such a narrow approach would not suffice
to address such ills as reduced property values, economic stagnation, heightened
crime and change in neighborhood character;" and that more aggressive law enforce-
ment measure were "generally only partially successful in stemming the criminal ac-
tivity that often surrounds adult establishments." Id.
198. Although the City of New York does conduct its own studies in Stringfellow's
of New York, 694 N.E.2d at 415-17, the words of the court of appeals in People ex rel.
Arcara suggest that more substantial action is to be taken:
[N]o undue burden is placed on the State by requiring it to prove that in
seeking to close the store it has chosen a course no broader than necessary
to accomplish its purpose. If other sanctions, such as arresting the offenders,
or injunctive relief prove unavailing, then its burden would be met.
People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 495 (N.Y. 1986) (emphasis
added).
199. Compare Stingfellow's of New York, 694 N.E.2d at 407, with Caviglia, 540
N.E.2d at 215.
200. Stingfellow's of New York, 694 N.E.2d at 407.
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Caviglia, it refuses to explicitly overrule People ex rel. Arcara, mak-
ing it unclear what standard is to be applied in cases such as Time
Square Books, and non-zoning cases generally.
III. RESOLUTION: SETTING A NEW YORK STATE PROTECTIVE
STANDARD AGAINST ALL FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION INFRINGEMENTS
The impact test implemented by People ex rel. Arcara is clearly
not the overarching standard it appeared to have been. This Part
examines what remains of People ex rel. Arcara after Caviglial
Stringfellow's of New York, and finds that there is no discernable
objective standard for separating "incidental burdens" cases from
"secondary effects" zoning cases. Therefore, courts may choose to
apply People ex rel. Arcara to "incidental burdens" cases, and non-
zoning "secondary effects" cases as they see fit, wholly ignoring the
Caviglia!Stringfellow's of New York standard. Finally, Part III ar-
gues that the court of appeals should adopt a substantial abatement
activity requirement for all incidental infringements to ensure a
higher standard of protection for free expression in New York
State.
A. What Does CaviglialStringfellow's of New York Mean for
People ex rel. Arcara?
In finding the Amended Zoning Resolution constitutional, the
Stringfellows's of New York court allowed the City of New York
the luxury of determining "the most appropriate means" of abating
the apparent nuisance. 2°1 The court of appeals did this while per-
petuating an empty People ex rel. Arcara standard which, initially,
appeared to offer legal speech substantial protection by requiring a
municipality to demonstrate that free expression infringements be
"no broader than needed" to abate adverse activities.2 °2
What is certain is that Caviglia and Stringfellow's of New York
are essentially a two-part adoption of the federal City of Renton
"predominant purpose" standard for assessing zoning-based in-
fringement of expressive freedoms.2 3 But Caviglia also clearly has
had an effect on lower court handling of non-zoning cases, such as
201. Supra Part I.D.
202. Supra Part I.B.
203. See Martin A. Schwartz, New York City Zones Out Free Expression, 43 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 301, 312-13 (1999). Schwartz finds the Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New
York focus on governmental attempts to alleviate secondary effects to be "directly
contrary" to the impact approach created in People ex rel. Arcara. Id.
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Dana and 777-779 Eighth Avenue.2 °4 Other than the appellate divi-
sion in Time Square Books, lower courts appear to apply the Cavig-
lia/Stringfellow's of New York standard to all cases involving
restriction of adult uses, whether those restrictions are "facially
content-based," "content-neutral," zoning, or non-zoning.2z 5 One
might say that while Caviglia and Stringfellow's of New York over-
rule People ex rel. Arcara, °6 the court of appeals, however, retains
the "no broader than needed" "[s]tate constitutional standard"
without explaining how it is to be applied; without making any
clear, logical distinction between Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New
York" secondary effects" cases and People ex rel. Arcara "inciden-
tal burdens" cases; and without perpetuating a factual distinction
that would make the Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New York stan-
dard's proper application obvious.20 7
One possible factual distinction is subject/not subject to "direct
attack" determination made by the court of appeals in Caviglia,
and then again by the appellate division in Time Square Books.2 °8
The Caviglia court factually distinguished Caviglia from People
ex rel. Arcara based on the "obvious[ness]" of potential alternative
abatement measures.209 The Caviglia court notes that in Arcara,
"there were obvious means for directly policing the illegal conduct
without closing premises on which a lawful business was being op-
erated. '2 10 However, in Caviglia, such alternatives were summarily
dismissed as unnecessary, and the ordinance was found to be "the
most appropriate means [of addressing the town's] substantive
problems. "211
Based on the factual similarities between Time Square Books
and Arcara, the appellate division makes a similar distinction, find-
ing that, although the ordinance at issue may be "facially content-
based," the strict People ex rel. Arcara standard nevertheless ap-
plied.2 12 However, the "secondary effects" attacked in Caviglia,
204. Supra Part II.B.
205. Id.
206. Schwartz, supra note 203, at 312-13. Schwartz suggests that the "striking con-
trast" between CaviglialStringfellow's of New York and People ex rel. Arcara may lead
to the conclusion "that [People ex rel. Arcara] is no longer good law." Id. (quoting
Vincent Martin Bonventre, Many Constitutional Challenges Fail, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5,
1998, at S3).
207. Supra Part II.D.
208. Supra Parts II.A & D.
209. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 223.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Supra Part I.B.
1824
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
which include "eradication of the effects of urban blight and neigh-
borhood deterioration" and "increased criminal activity,''213 are as
subject to "direct attack" through arrests, injunction, policing, or
enforcement of lesser restrictions as are the illegal activities in Peo-
ple ex rel. Arcara or Time Square Books.214 The Caviglia majority
as much as admits that other techniques could successfully abate
the nuisance, but determines that that does not mean "that [such
alternatives] are constitutionally required. ' 215 The only real dis-
tinction is one subjectively made by the court of appeals: the mu-
nicipality need not directly attack adverse effects in Caviglia or
Stringfellow's of New York.216 A subject/not subject to "direct at-
tack" determination amounts to little more than an arbitrary dis-
tinction between "secondary effects" zoning cases, such as
Caviglia, and other "incidental burdens" cases, such as People ex
rel. Arcara or Time Square Books.2 17 Yet the court of appeals
never says this.218 Rather than delineating a clear means of deter-
mining the proper applications of the Caviglia/Stringfellow's of
New York and People ex rel. Arcara standards, the "direct attack"
distinction creates a standard under which the constitutionality of
attacking substantially the same adverse effects is completely de-
pendant upon a court's subjective assessment of the weight to give
legislative purpose.219
For example, although no "direct attack" justification was given,
there is no discernable factual reason why the adverse effects in
Dana, Capri, or 777-779 Eighth Avenue Corp., all "incidental bur-
dens" type cases, are any less subject to "direct attack" than are the
213. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 219.
214. Compare id. and City of New York v. 777-779 Eighth Avenue Corp., 640
N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), with People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,
503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986), and Time Square Books v. City of Rochester, 645
N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
215. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 223.
216. See id.
217. Compare People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y.
1986), and Time Square Books, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 645 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), with Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1989), and
Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407 (N.Y. 1998).
218. Compare People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y.
1986), and Time Square Books, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 645 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), with Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1989), and
Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407 (N.Y. 1998).
219. Compare People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y.
1986), and Time Square Books, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 645 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), with Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1989), and
Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407 (N.Y. 1998).
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adverse effects in Arcara or Time Square Books.220 The distinction
between the cases is not whether the respective adverse effects are
subject to "direct attack," but whether each court decides to put
legislative purpose above protecting free expression.22'
Legislative purpose is of paramount importance and largely ac-
cepted without question under Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New
York.222 But such purpose was to be of no importance under Peo-
ple ex rel. Arcara.223 A subject/not subject to "direct attack" deter-
mination creates no discernible standard.
Removing the subject/not subject to "direct attack" justification
from Time Square Books and Caviglia reveals the problem created
by the Caviglia court. The court of appeals in Caviglia essentially
adopted the federal City of Renton standard for zoning regulation
of "secondary effects," while failing to properly explain its impact
on "incidental burdens" type cases such as People ex rel. Arcara,
which the appellate division is therefore still able to follow in Time
Square Books.224 The result is that, simply because different courts
will weigh legislative purpose differently, New York State case law
potentially makes it more difficult for a municipality to shut down
an adult use by directly attacking illegal activity conducted on the
premises, than it is to shut down an adult use by implementing
"facially content-based" ordinances and zoning out legal speech.225
Municipal purpose thus may have effect in reverse logical or-
220. Compare People ex rel, Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y.
1986), and Time Square Books, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 645 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), with Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1989), and
Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407 (N.Y. 1998).
221. Compare People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y.
1986), and Time Square Books, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 645 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), with Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1989), and
Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407 (N.Y. 1998).
222. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 218-19. The Caviglia majority notes that:
When applying the predominant purpose requirement of Renton, courts do
not invalidate a municipal zoning ordinance simply because one or more
legislators sought to suppress protected expression. While Renton requires
an examination of a municipality's motive in enacting the ordinance before
examining whether the ordinance is a valid time, place, and manner restric-
tion, it is motive of the Legislature, not the individual legislators, that is
controlling.
Id. at n.2 (citation omitted); Schwartz, supra note 203, at 308-09 (discussing the diffi-
culty of determining legislative intent).
223. Supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
224. Supra Part II.
225. Supra Part II.
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der 226-directly zoning free expression is presumptively valid,227
while closing a use because of illegal activity conducted there may
be substantially more difficult, although doing so only indirectly
and incidentally burdens free expression.228
The Stringfellow's of New York court did nothing to alleviate this
problem. 2 9 Although the court of appeals clearly set Caviglial
Stringfellow's of New York as the standard for balancing "commu-
nity needs and free expression "230 in "these cases, '"231 just which
cases "these cases" are is made entirely unclear by the courts ac-
knowledgment of People ex rel. Arcara as "our State constitutional
standard. "232
The court of appeals adherence to the hollow People ex rel. Ar-
cara standard allows room for decisions, such as Time Square
Books, that buck the clear trend of lower court acceptance of a
Caviglia tainted interpretation of People ex rel. Arcara for all types
of incidental infringements, whether "secondary-effects" based or
"incidental burdens" based.233 At the very least, People ex rel. Ar-
226. Recall that under federal Constitutional minimum standards, regulations that
indirectly incidentally burden free expression need only have a rational basis, whereas
regulations that directly incidentally burden free expression and "facially content-
based" regulations justified by pursuits other than restricting free expression are sub-
ject to higher scrutiny. Supra Part I.A.
227. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d at 217 ("Because zoning ordinances are legislative acts
they enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality and if there is a reasonable rela-
tion between the end sought to be achieved and the means adopted to achieve it the
regulation will be upheld.").
228. Compare People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y.
1986), and Time Square Books, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 645 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), with Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1989), and
Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York; 694 N.E.2d 407 (N.Y. 1998).
229. See Stringfellow's of New York, 694 N.E.2d at 414-15.
230. Id. at 415.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 414.
233. Supra Part II.B. The Time Square Books dissent relies predominantly on
Caviglia and City of Renton, calling the regulation a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction incidentally burdening free expression, and blurring the line be-
tween zoning regulation cases and incidental burden cases. Time Square Books v. City
of Rochester, 645 N.Y.S.2d 951, 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (Boehm, J., dissenting);
see John B. Nesbitt, Local Government, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 633, 643-44 (1997).
Nesbitt argues that the dissenters in Time Square Books "better comprehend[ ] the
track constitutional analysis takes in such cases, both in terms of the nature of the
legislative record required and the municipal burden to disprove the effectiveness of
less restrictive alternatives." Id. at 643. In support, Nesbitt cites the dissents' recogni-
tion that "the city was entitled to rely upon prior judicial decisions upholding open
booth requirements as a constitutionally permissible manner of preventing the spread
of sexually transmitted diseases," and that "lt]he dissent correctly noted that courts
need not revisit the issue de novo each time similar legislation is adopted by another
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cara required a municipality take some action in attempted abate-
ment as proof that no less restrictive manner of quelling adverse
activity would be successful before closure would be allowed.2 3 4
There are no such abatement activity requirements under the
Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New York glossed version of People ex
rel. Arcara.235 The result of Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New York is
that New York courts are not offering any substantial additional
protection to expression that is either indirectly "incidentally bur-
dened," or burdened through "facially content-based" attacks on
"secondary-effects, 236 completely undermining the holding of
New York's "[s]tate constitutional standard. '237  Unless, that is,
for no objective factual reason, a court decides to directly follow
People ex rel. Arcara.238
B. What Should Be Done to Reestablish a Higher Standard for
Protection of Free Expression in New York State?
There are several solutions to the potential illogical effects of
retaining the People ex rel. Arcara standard while substantially al-
lowing the free zoning of protected speech. The New York Court
of Appeals must either (1) broadly apply the People ex rel. Arcara
distinction to all "content-neutral" attacks on protected speech,239
whether those attacks "directly incidentally burden" speech, "indi-
rectly incidentally burden" speech, or are "facially content-based"
justified attacks on "secondary effects;" (2) accept that People ex
rel. Arcara is dead, and acknowledge that New York State does not
offer any substantial additional protection to legal speech that is
incidentally burdened or restricted by a justified attack on "secon-
municipality." Id. Additionally, Nesbitt adds that: "if reconsideration of settled deci-
sional authority is merited, the burden should be on those challenging the regulation
to demonstrate a change in the controlling principles of law or present competent
proof of facts unique to the regulation in its local application or new to the issue
generally. Id.
234. Schwartz, supra note 203, at 312. Schwartz frames the People ex rel. Arcara
holding in general terms: "to obtain a closure order under the state constitution, the
government must demonstrate that it cannot accomplish its purposes through other
means, such as by arresting the offenders or granting injunctive relief." Id.
235. Supra Part II.
236. Supra Part II.A-B, D.
237. Stringfellow's of New York, 694 N.E.2d at 417.
238. Supra Part II.C.
239. This is what the court of appeals appeared to do in People ex rel. Arcara, mak-
ing no distinction between types of free expression infringements, and instead decid-
ing that any time free expression is "hit," a municipality must prove that the means
undertaken to remedy the apparent nuisances is "no broader than needed to achieve
the purpose of the legislation." Supra Part I.D.
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dary effects; ' 241 or (3) implement a new standard that substantially
maintains the balance between "community needs and free expres-
sion" delineated in Caviglia, while requiring municipal proof that
substantial attempted abatement measures were taken, as in People
ex rel. Arcara.
The court of appeals is unlikely to backtrack upon the Caviglia/
Stringfellow's of New York slant on People ex rel. Arcara to such an
extent that it would truly require a municipality prove closure of an
adult use is "no broader than needed" to abate an apparent nui-
sance, or at least not to the degree implied in People ex rel. Ar-
cara.24  However, if the court truly intends to continue New York
State's "long history and tradition of fostering freedom of expres-
sion, [by] often tolerating and supporting works which in other
[s]tates would be found offensive to the community, '242 then more
stringent requirements must be implemented than those of the
Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New York glossed People ex rel. Arcara
standard.243
One potential solution is to require municipalities prove that
substantial abatement activities have been undertaken in all cases
involving the "content-neutral" infringement of protected speech.
Such a standard should include an actual sanction 244 requirement,
as in People ex rel. Arcara, but should not require a municipality go
so far as to prove that closure is "no broader than necessary" (in
the People ex rel. Arcara sense) to abate adverse and illegal activ-
ity.245 A sanction requirement should necessitate a municipality's
240. This is the general trend in New York State caselaw. Lower courts may or may
not invoke the People ex rel. Arcara standard, but they are not following it to any
substantial degree, or in the case of Time Square Books, for any discernable reason.
Any application of the standard to "incidental burdens" type cases carries a heavy
Caviglia/Stringfellow's gloss, unless a court, as in Time Square Books, decides to re-
move that gloss. Supra Part II.B.
241. Compare Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d
407 (N.Y. 1998), with People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 495
(N.Y. 1986); "[N]o undue burden is placed on the state by requiring it to prove that in
seeking "to close the store it has chosen a course no broader than necessary to accom-
plish its purpose. If other sanctions, such as arresting the offenders, or injunctive re-
lief prove unavailing, then its burden would be met." People ex rel. Arcara, 503
N.E.2d at 495 (emphasis added).
242. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
243. Supra Part II.
244. People ex rel. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 495.
245. People ex rel. Arcara implicitly requires "sanctions" as proof that the munici-
pality is employing a solution "no broader than needed" to abate the nuisance. A
new standard might require a substantial "sanction" be imposed in attempted abate-
ment prior to the allowance of closure. This standard would require less than People
ex rel. Arcara, yet more than Caviglia/Stringfellow's of New York.
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showing that some measure, in the nature of sanctions, was im-
posed and proved insufficient to abate adverse effects and illegal
activity prior to closure being allowed.
This standard effectively would do away with municipal reliance
solely on studies conducted by other cities in "secondary-effects"
type cases,246 and municipal reliance solely on case-law involving
similar factual situations247 in "incidental burdens" cases, while in-
suring that each and every instance of free expression infringement
is considered individually at a standard higher than the federal gov-
ernment's and, at the initial level, without regard to legislative
purpose.248
CONCLUSION
United States Supreme Court rulings concerning fundamental
rights create minimum standards. It is the prerogative of individual
state high courts to build upon those minimum standards and flesh-
out fundamental rights protection. New York State purports to do
just that for all "incidental burdens" on protected speech with the
"no broader than needed" language of People ex rel. Arcara.249
However, the words of the court of appeals are hollow, and People
ex rel. Arcara's guideless application potentially makes it more dif-
ficult to "indirectly incidentally burden" free expression than to di-
rectly zone-out such expression. It is time for the court of appeals
to implement an overarching standard that insures municipalities
must take substantial steps before free expression may be in-
fringed. Only then may the court of appeals honestly say that New
York State's Constitution offers free expression greater protection
than it receives under the federal Constitution.
246. At the very least, a requirement that substantial attempted abatement mea-
sures proved insufficient would necessitate a municipality rely on its own studies and
information. Supra note 60 and accompanying text; Schwartz, supra note 203, at 311
(arguing that the actual requirements imposed on a municipality under City of Ren-
ton/CaviglialStringfellow's of New York "hardly seems like an attempt to balance free
speech and municipal concerns in a meaningful fashion").
247. Supra note 140.
248. Supra Part II.C. Any assessment of what measures are "no broader than
needed to achieve the purpose" of a regulation inevitably involves a determination of
how much weight to give legislative purpose. However, requiring some form of sanc-
tion be imposed prior to such an assessment will at least insure that some manner of
abatement activity was pursued in each individual case.
249. 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986).
1830
